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I
THE IDEA OF INTEGRATION
Economic integration of the three North American countries, Canada, Mexico
and the United States, is not an entirely new idea. Particularly in Canada there
has been a long standing interest in, and controversy about, closer economic ties
wth the United States. In the automotive industry free trade has already been
established between the two countries. This is not surprising, given the fact that
each of the two countries is the most important trading partner of the other. Ad-
ding Mexico to the equation is more novel. But even here one may note the large
scale mobility of labor from Mexico to the United States (both legal and illegal)
and the considerable flow of investment capital from the United States to its south-
ern neighbor.
Yet formal integration of the three countries must still be considered an idea
whose time has not arrived. Political, economic and even emotional animosities in
Mexico towards the United States are all too well known. Even in Canada there is
widespread fear that with integration "Canadians will become hewers of wood and
drawers of water."' In both cases there is a rational or irrational fear of the eco-
nomic giant across the border. Integration in other parts of the world has usually
occurred among countries smaller and more equal in size and economic develop-
ment than would be the case in North America.
However, the future may bring fresh impetus to integration. Increased mili-
tary, political and economic pressures around the globe may drive the three coun-
tries closer together (although, admittedly, it may also pull them apart). The
discovery of new energy sources in Mexico, Alaska (which is separated by Canada
from the "lower" 48 states) and Canada, may dictate closer cooperation in invest-
ments, production and consumption in decades of increasing energy scarcity. The
same may be said about other primary commodities. Migration pressure of Mexi-
can workers may also dictate closer cooperation. Paradoxical as it may seem, pres-
sure for secession in Quebec province may drive the Western and "far eastern"
provinces of Canada to form closer economic ties with the United States.
In a more general way, exploration of ideas often precedes political action by
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years or even decades. Hence it is not premature to examine the feasibility and the
impact of North American integration.
II
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION GENERALLY
A. Introduction
Almost any formal measure of economic integration would strengthen the ties
between the three countries, cause an adjustment to new circumstances within
each of the three economies, call for some surrender of national sovereignty in a
specified area of economic policy, and probably discriminate against outsiders.
Factors affecting the decision to adopt integration measures include limitations
imposed by prior international agreement as well as the effects of underlying eco-
nomic principles. This section will discuss the international trade rules and the
economic considerations involved in a North American integration policy.
B. The Effect of GATT
The United States and Canada (but not Mexico) are members of the Geneva-
based organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
must abide by its rules.2 For example, GATT rules forbid such conduct as dump-
ing and governmental imposition of export subsidies. They also permit an import-
ing country receiving "dumped" commodities to levy countervailing duty against
them.
1. The GA TTMFNrule. One important and long standing rule is a principle
of nondiscrimination in international trade. Under it, a country must apply the
same import duty on a given product to the exports of all GATT members supply-
ing that product. All sources of supply of a given product are charged the same
duty, provided that they are members of GATT. Equivalently, any tariff reduc-
tion on a commodity must apply to all GATT members supplying that commod-
ity. This is known as the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle. 3
This rule has been violated on many occasions by countries on both sides of
the Atlantic. 4 In the case of North America, the Canadian-U.S. Automobile
2. GATT The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-is a multilateral treaty, subscribed to by
over ninety governments which together account for more than four fifths of world trade. Its basic aim is
to liberalize world trade, and place it on a secure basis, thereby contributing to economic growth and
development and the welfare of the world's peoples. The General Agreement is the only multilateral in-
strument that lays down agreed-upon rules for international trade.
The Geneva based organization was established in 1948. For thirty years, GATT has also functioned as
the principal international body concerned with negotiating the reduction of trade barriers and with inter-
national trade relations. GATT is thus both a code of rules and aforum in which countries can discuss and
overcome their trade problems and negotiate to enlarge world trading opportunities.
For details see the short pamphlet GATT, GATT, WHAT IT IS; WHAT IT DOES (1977). Once a year
GATT publishes a pamphlet describing its activities, the latest being GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES, 1980
(1981) as well as a pamphlet analyzing world trade developments during the year, the latest being GAFF,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1980/81 (1981).
3. GATT, GATT, WHAT IT IS; WHAT IT DOES, supra note 2, at 2.
4. M. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICs-A POLICY APPROACH 355 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as KREININ]. See also GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES (published annually).
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Agreement, 5 which freed trade in automobiles and parts between the two coun-
tries, discriminates against European and Japanese producers, and is thus in viola-
tion of the MFN rule. GATT regulations require a waiver for any deviations from
the rule.6 While often the countries involved failed to seek such a waiver, good
international conduct dictates compliance with the principle. Otherwise, the
smoothly functioning international trading system among the industrial countries
could be in jeopardy.
2. Exceptions to the MFN Rule Govern'ng LDCs Trade. During the past decade
a general waiver has been granted for the exports of the developing countries
(otherwise known as Less Developed Countries or LDCs). 7 To accommodate this
general system of preferences (GSP), industrial countries are permitted to grant
favored treatment to imports from the LDCs over imports from other industrial
countries. Under the U.S. and Canadian GSP, LDCs' exports of manufactured
products enter the two countries duty free. This treatment applies to Mexican
exports as well, but there are several limitations on the type and quantity of im-
ports that are accorded this beneficial treatment. As a result of these restrictions,
the benefits to LDCs' exports, including those of Mexico, are very limited.
Much more beneficial to Mexico is U.S. tariff item 807.00.8 Under it, a com-
pany can use U.S. materials in its foreign plants, subject them to further
fabrication abroad, reimport them to the United States for further (perhaps final)
processing, and pay duty only on the value added abroad.
To illustrate the point, assume that four stages are needed to manufacture a
certain product (e.g., raw wood-lumber-semifinished desk-finished desk). At each
stage a value of $100 is added, for a total price of $400 for the final product.
Assume that the first two stages are done in the United States, and the resulting
semiprocessed good, worth $200, is shipped to Mexico for third stage fabrication.
The resulting semifinished product, worth $300, is then reimported into the
United States for final processing. Although that import is worth $300, the duty is
levied only on the $100 value added in Mexico-quite a considerable saving.
Mexican law, in turn, permits the importation of the semiprocessed good (worth
$200) free of Mexican duty, creating a free trade zone in order to further en-
courage processing inside Mexico. 9
Hundreds of American plants, set up just south of the border, owe their exist-
ence largely to this provision. They take advantage of lower labor costs in Mexico,
and at the same time provide employment to Mexican workers. This system is
5. KREININ, supra note 4.
6. GATT, GA'T, WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DoEs, supra note 2, at 3; GA'T, GATT ACTivITlEs (pub-
lished annually).
7. GATT, GATT, WHAT IT Is, WHAT IT DOES, supra note 2, at 13-15; KREININ, supra note 4, at ch.
17.
8. Finger, Trade and Domestic Efects of the Ojfhore Assemby Proviion tn the US Tarif, 66 AM. ECON. REV.
598 (1976); Finger, TariffProvisitns for O shore Assembl and the Exports of Developing Countries, 85 ECON. J. 365
(1975). See also Kreinin and Finger, A Critical Review of the New International Economic Order, J. WORLD
TRADE L. (Nov./Dec. 1976).
9. KREININ, supra note 4, at ch. 17.
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estimated to have stimulated much more LDC exports than the GSP.'0 Such U.S.
investments in Mexico would certainly be encouraged if the U.S. tariff on imports
from Mexico were eliminated altogether.
But the preferences outlined above are generally a one-way street, favoring the
LDCs. They apply to the treatment of Mexican exports in the United States and
Canada, but not to U.S. and Canadian exports in Mexico. Regional integration
must involve a two-way favored treatment.
3. General Excepttons to the MFN Rule. To accommodate regional integration
schemes, the GATT MFN rule has a couple of general exceptions. Besides a
grandfather clause that allows tariff preference between a "mother country" and
its former colonies, GATT rules permit the establishment of (i) free trade areas,
and (ii) customs unions.lI
A customs union involves two or more countries that abolish all trade restric-
tions among themselves and set up a common and uniform tariff against outsiders,
known as the common external tariff. The level of that tariff is set by the member
states, and becomes the measure of discrimination against outsiders, or the margin
of preference in favor of members. Members of the customs union pay no duty
while outsiders are subject to the common external tariff. A free trade area (FTA)
also involves the abolition of trade restriction among the integrating countries.
But, in contrast to a customs union, each country retains its own tariff rates against
nonmembers, so that there is no common external tariff. The margin of discrimi-
nation against outsiders varies from one member to another and equals each coun-
try's tariff: nonmembers pay the tariff, while members of the FTA export duty free
within the area.
To qualify for either of the two exceptions to the MFN rule, all or most of the
trade restrictions within the area must be removed; and the tariff levied on imports
from nonmembers must be no higher than the average rates prevailing prior to
integration.' 2 In the case of a customs union this means that the common external
tariff may not exceed the weighted average of the individual countries' tariffs.
Numerous regional integration schemes fall under one of these two categories.
The European Communities of nine members, and the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation of six small countries, are illustrations of a customs union and FTA, respec-
tively, in Europe. The Central American Common Market is a customs union of
five countries in Central America. African countries have formed such regional
groupings, and negotiations for similar units are being held in Asia. Finally, the
Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) is an FTA encompassing seven major
Latin American countries, including Mexico. In other words, Mexico is already a
member of an FTA with Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Vene-
zuela.
A regional grouping may of course proceed further in the integration process
than the mere freeing of trade. For example, it may allow free flow of investment
10. See note 8 supra.
11. KREININ, supra note 4, at ch. 16; GATT, GATT, WHAT IT Is, WHAT IT DoEs, supra note 2, at 5.
12. Id
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and other capital, and/or full labor mobility between member countries. It may
have a common agricultural policy, coordinate domestic fiscal and monetary poli-
cies, and even proceed in the direction of monetary integration toward a common
currency. The further the progress toward integration, the greater the surrender of
national sovereignty on the part of member countries.
C. The Economics of Regional Integration
1. Static Effects. The body of economic analysis dealing with regional inte-
gration, dating back to the work of Jacob Viner and James Meade,1 3 is concerned
mainly with the effect of a regional grouping on worldwide economic efficiency
and allocation of resources. It has become traditional to distinguish two contrast-
ing effects: a favorable trade creation and an unfavorable trade diversion. Because they
are concerned with reorganization of production with a given amount of resources,
these are known as static effects.
Consider a three-country world in which countries A and B form a customs
union to the exclusion of C. Three effects on the world economy will occur. First,
with respect to products in which A and B are competitive, the elimination of
tariffs between them causes the replacement of some high-cost production by im-
ports from the partner country. This effect, known as "trade creation," is
favorable to welfare because it rationally reorganizes production within the union.
Second, for products in which country C is competitive with one of the integrating
countries, A or B begins to import from the other what it earlier imported from C.
If C is the most efficient producer, it will be the major supplier as long as its prod-
ucts receive the same tariff treatment as those of its competitor. The tariff discrim-
ination, however, induces diversion of trade away from C toward a member
country. This effect, known as "trade diversion," is unfavorable, because it reor-
ganizes world production less efficiently. Production shifts from the most efficient
locations in C to less efficient ones inside the union. Finally, there is a favorable
consumption effect, as consumers in each member state benefit from price reduc-
tion on imports from the partner country when intraunion tariffs are removed. It
is usually lumped together with trade creation.1
4
In order to measure the magnitude of these effects empirically, one must first
isolate the effect of integration on trade flows. Over any given time period there is
a multitude of factors that affect these flows. Foremost among them are changes in
real income and changes in each country's competitive position (relative prices).
The influence of these and other factors on trade flows need to be "removed" so
that only the effect of integration remains.
Once the effect of these extraneous factors is removed, the measure of the two
integration effects is as follows: (i) trade creation is the diminution of domestic
output inside the integrating countries A or B, it being replaced by cheaper im-
ports from the partner country; and (ii) trade diversion is the diminution of the
13. J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE ch. 4 (1950); J. MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UN-
IONS (1955).
14. We overlook another less important effect. The "terms of trade" of the integrating area are likely
to improve at the expense of the rest of the world.
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customs union's imports from country C, known as external imports, it being re-
placed by imports from within the customs union. The increase in intraunion
trade is trade creation and diversion combined. Thus the increase in country A's
imports from B is partly at the expense of A's output (trade creation) and partly at
the expense of C's exports (trade diversion).
In the case of the European communities, empirical studies have shown trade
creation to be five to seven times greater than trade diversion.' 5 Various studies
also demonstrated that the vast expansion of intra-European trade took the form
of intraindustry rather than interindustry specialization.' 6 There has been no
large scale contraction of entire industries in any one country as their products are
replaced by imports from another member. Rather, the same industries in various
member countries moved to specialize in specific types of subproducts. This eases
the adjustment to freer trade, since labor and capital need not be moved between
industries. Increased intraindustry specialization is characteristic of trade flows
among industrial countries.
2. Dynamic ffects. Equally important, although far less tangible, are the dy-
namic effects of integration. The nonreversible removal of trade barriers in a cus-
toms union or FTA creates a far wider market than that of each individual
country. This enables firms to exploit economies of scale in production and distri-
bution activities, increases competition between firms since the expanded market
can support more sizeable firms in each industry, and encourages investments by
both domestic and foreign companies. All these influences promote faster growth
in real GNP and place the integrating region on a higher growth trajectory. The
smaller the integrating countries are, the more important these effects are likely to
be.
In the case of North America, while the United States is large enough to enjoy
all the benefits of scale even without integration, Canada and Mexico are not.
These countries could draw considerable benefits from expanded market size and
from the stimulus to investments associated with integration. Certainly invest-
ments in Mexico would expand if the product of such plants could enter the U.S.
market duty free.
3. Issues Concerntng LDCs. The concepts outlined above cannot be directly
applied to all cases, especially where LDCs are involved. Where there is little in-
dustrial base, integration may benefit a country's industrialization policy. A coun-
try intent on industrializing via a strategy of import substitution, or replacing imports
with new domestic production under the umbrella of a heavily protective import
regime, may pursue that strategy more efficiently in the combined market of sev-
eral countries than in the minute individual market of each country.
Also, where no industrial base exists prior to integration, no trade creation can
15. Kreinin, Effects of the EEC on Imports of Manufactures, 82 ECON. J. 897 (1972); Kreinin, Effect of EC
Enlargement on Trade n Manufactures, 34 KYKLOS 1 (1981).
16. Kreinin, Effect of EC Enlargement on Trade in Manufactures, 34 KYKLoS app. (198 1); Balassa, Tariff
Reductions and Trade in Manufactures, 56 AM. ECON. REv. 466 (1966).
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be expected. In this case, trade diversion may be beneficial. The harm of trade
diversion is rooted in the reallocation of productive resources, such as labor, from
more to less efficient uses; if the resources are unemployed from the outset, no
harm is caused. In many LDCs, there is much disguised and overt unemploy-
ment. 1 7 If trade diversion provides employment to otherwise unemployed re-
sources, it may be beneficial.
Another special consideration regarding LDCs relates to the countries' eco-
nomic base. When one nation starts from a more advanced base than the rest of
the integrated area, it is likely to attract many incipient industries in anticipation
of supplying the entire customs union. This phenomenon is known aspolarzzaton.
It suggests an uneven distribution of the benefits from integration. Special provi-
sions must be made to minimize this effect, lest some of the countries grow increas-
ingly dissatisfied.
These considerations suggest that the standard anlysis of integration cannot be
applied, blindly to a grouping such as North America which includes countries at
vastly different stages of economic development.
4. Apphcations to the North Amertcan Grouping. The amount of trade creation
and diversion likely to occur in an integration situation depends on the size of the
area, the amount of intra-area trade, thecharacter and costs of production in each
country, and tariff protection against nonmembers. It is possible to speculate on
the criteria that determine the size of trade creation and diversion as they apply to
a North American economic grouping.
First, the larger the economic size of the integrating area is, the greater the
likelihood of trade creation and the smaller the probability of trade diversion. At
the extreme, an FTA encompassing the entire globe can cause only trade creation.
With North America accounting for 28 percent of worldwide GNP, trade creation
is likely to be relatively large.
Second, the greater the share of intra-area trade in the countries' total trade
prior to integration, the greater is the scope for trade creation and the smaller the
scope for trade diversion. Table 4 shows that over two thirds of Canada's and
Mexico's trade is with their North American partners. For the United States the
respective share is one quarter. This suggests that trade creation is likely to be
much larger than trade diversion.
Third, the more similar the type of products produced by the integrating econ-
omies, the more likely they are to displace each other's output in products in which
each, respectively, has a comparative advantage, and the greater the likelihood of
trade creation. Conversely, the more dissimilar and complementary the output,
the greater the likelihood of trade diversion. One may therefore expect considera-
ble trade diversion to occur in the case of North American integration; however,
this result is mitigated by considerations outlined below.' 8
A fourth criterion is the size of production cost differentials between the three
17. KREININ, supra note 4, at ch. 17; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA (W. Cline & E.
Delgado eds. 1978).
18. See the discussion at 30-31 infra.
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countries in each of the various industries. The larger the differential, the greater
the scope for displacement of output in one country by that of another member
once protection is removed, since protection makes possible the maintenance of
such differentials. On that criterion one can expect large trade creation in the case
of North American integration.
Next, the higher the level of tariff protection against imports from nonmem-
bers, the higher the scope for trade diversion. In the case of North America, me-
dium level protection can be expected, leaving some scope for trade diversion.
Finally, the commodity composition of the trade between the three members is
such that sizeable trade creation can be anticipated.
In sum, while both trade creation and diversion can be expected to result from
North American integration, a conjecture is that trade creation is likely to be
larger.
III
INTEGRATION IN NORTH AMERICA
A. Alternative Modes for North American Integration
Some special economic ties already exist between the three North American
countries. They include: the U.S.-Canada automobile agreement covering autos
and parts; a reasonably integrated market for capital between New York, Mon-
treal and Toronto; U.S. tariff item 807.00, of which Mexico is one main benefici-
ary; general flow of investment capital from the United States to Canada and
Mexico; the U.S. and Canadian GSP which benefits Mexico (along with other
LDCs) to a limited degree; and the migration of labor from Mexico to the United
States. The development of oil and natural gas resources in Mexico is likely to
strengthen economic ties, as geographical proximity makes the United States the
natural market for these products. The concern of this article, however, is with the
establishment of more formal ties.
1. A Customs Union. Because it requires a common external tariff, a customs
union is not a realistic possibility for North American integration, and should not
even be contemplated. Not only is the level of the Mexican tariff double that of its
U.S. counterpart, but the structure (ile., differences in rates imposed on different
products) is also different. Canadian rates generally fall between the two.' 9 It
would be nearly impossible to negotiate a common external tariff. Besides, a cus-
toms union could not accommodate Mexico's membership in LAFTA. For these
reasons an FTA in manufactured products is the only feasible alternative.
2. A Free Trade Area. The lowest form of formal regional grouping appropri-
ate for the three North American countries is a free trade area in manufactured
19. Balassa, TarffProtecion in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation, 73 J. POL. ECON. 27 (Dec. 1965); B.
BALASSA, THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971). See also WONNACOTT &
WONNACOrT, supra note 1, at ch. 12.
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products. Not requiring a common external tariff, it avoids the need for compro-
mise on this thorny issue between countries of vastly different tariff levels and for-
eign trade objectives and obligations. Thus Mexico can remain a member of
LAFTA, admitting imports from other Latin American members duty free. On
imports from other continents, the Mexican tariff rates can remain a multiple of its
U.S. counterpart. In turn, the United States and Canada may continue any spe-
cial import regimes with respect to imports from other continents, such as the GSP
or U.S. tariff item 807.00.
An FTA calls for promulgation and enforcement of "rules of origin" to avoid
transshipment of external imports into one member state through another.2 0 For
example, if the Mexican duty on bicycles is 40 percent while the U.S. duty is only
10 percent, British bikes can be shipped to the United States at the lower tariff,
and then move duty free into Mexico. Border check points to ascertain the true
origin of goods are not sufficient. The British producer can bypass them by super-
ficial fabrication in the United States, adding only finishing touches to the bike
that was actually produced in Britain. For that reason an FTA needs to spell out
what proportion of the value of a product must be produced within the area for it
to be accorded duty free status. In the case of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion, that proportion is one-half.21 While this adds administrative complexity, it is
not an insurmountable obstacle.
Although it is a relatively loose organization an FTA requires the surrender of
some measure of national sovereignty. Each country relinquishes the right to im-
pose trade restrictions on its imports from the partner countries.
Because the internal adjustment problems may be severe in certain industries
and locations, political resistance to an FTA is likely to be strong. At best tariff
reductions among the three members would have to be staged over a period of at
least a decade. Since this FTA encompasses two fully industrialized countries and
one semi-industrialized country, Mexico would require a much longer transitional
period.
3. Other Measures. What of steps going beyond the freeing of trade? A com-
mon labor pool, which would imply free labor mobility, is unrealistic to contem-
plate. Given the huge differential in wage rates between the United States and
Mexico, it would be far too unsettling to labor markets. But some ad hoc measures
to regulate labor movement can be negotiated. It should be noted that the freeing
of trade may remove some of the incentives for Mexican workers to migrate to the
United States. Ad hoc measures to stimulate capital movements can also be nego-
tiated.
A common currency, or a significant move toward immutably fixed exchange
rates, is also out of the question at this time. The Canadian dollar is a floating
currency; it fluctuates daily against the U.S. dollar in response to supply and de-
mand conditions. While the Mexican peso has been de facto fixed at 4.1 cents for
the past several years, the Mexican government can change the rate (devalue or
20. KREININ, supra note 4, at ch. 16.
21. Id.
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revalue the peso) as circumstances warrant. 22 Under immutably fixed exchange
rates each country must relinquish its right to change the value of its currency, a
very unlikely occurrence. Such a regime requires a high measure of coordination
of domestic fiscal and monetary policies, and the constituent countries would not
be willing to surrender sovereignty in these matters. There might even be fears in
Canada and Mexico that under such an arrangement their monetary policies
would be decided in Washington. Last, and most emphatically, the very introduc-
tion of free trade would call for certain exchange rate adjustments to balance the
external accounts.
In sum, the only formal agreement that is reasonable to consider is a free trade
area in manufactured products, to be put into effect in small steps over a very long
transitional period.
B. Structure of the Three Economies
An FTA in North America would be unprecedented in at least two important
respects. First, it would incorporate two industrial countries (the United States
and Canada) and one developing country (Mexico). All other integration schemes
in the world involve customs unions or FTAs among countries at equal stages of
development, either industrialized or developing. Second, the U.S. economy
dominates the region to a degree unfound in other regional groupings, being ten
times the size of Canada and twenty-two times that of Mexico. These features are
likely to pose difficulties in the integration process. The extent of the countries'
socio-economic disparity is illustrated in Table I. The GNP and per capita GNP
TABLE 1
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE ECONOMIES
1979 U.S.A. Canada Mexico
Area (square kilometers) 9,363 9,976 1,973
Population (millions) 224 24 65
GNP (billions of U.S. dollars) 2,377 228 108
GNP per capita (U.S. dollars) 10,820 9,650 1,590
Adult literacy 99% 99% 82%
Life expectancy at birth 74 74 66
Annual Growth Rates (%)
Population (1970-1978) 0.8% 1.3% 3.3%
GNP per capita (1970-1978) 2.3% 3.0% 1.3%
GNP per capita (1960-1979) 2.4% 3.5% 2.7%
Average annual rate of inflation (1960-1970) 2.8% 3.1% 3.6%
Average annual rate of inflation (1970-1979) 6.9% 9.1% 18.3%
Currency: Canadian Dollar Peso
July 1981 exchange rates $1 U.S. = $1.21 Can. $1 U.S. = 24.5 pesos
$1 Can. = U.S. 82.6¢ 1 peso = U.S. 4.1¢
Sources: WORLD BANK ATI.AS, (1980); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1981); FED.
RES. BULL. A66 (Aug. 1981).
22. For Exchange Rate arrangements of various countries see the Supplement on the Fund, IMF SURVEY
6-7 (May 1981).
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TABLE 2
STRUCTURE OF THE THREE ECONOMIES
U.S.A.
1960 1979
A. Distribution of the Labor Force (%)
7% 2%
36 32
57 66
B. Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (%)
4% 3%
38 34
58 63
Canada
1960 1979
13% 5%
35 29
52 66
6% 4%
34 33
60 63
Mexico
1960 1979
55% 37%
20 26
25 37
16% 10%
29 38
55 52
C. Detailed Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (%)
Agriculture 3%
Industry
Mining 3
Manufacturing 24
Electricity, gas,
water 2
Construction 5
Services
Trade 18
Transport 6
Other 39
(1978) $2,112 b.
D. Energy Consumption (kg. of coal equivalent)
Per capita
Per dollar of GDP
(1960 and 1978)
8,228 12,350
1.6 1.4
(S Can.) $266.0 b.
7,087 13,453
1.3 1.3 0.9 1.0
E. Value Added in Manufacturing (1978)
Food 11% 13% 22%
Textile and clothing 6 7 11
Machinery and
transport
equipment 32 23 17
Chemicals 11 8 14
Other manufactures 40 49 36
TOTAL, Billions
of 1975 Dollars 434 37 25
F. Structure of Demand (1979)
Private consumption 62% 56% 64%
Public consumption 12 19 18
Gross domestic
investments 28 24 19
Exports of goods
and services 12 28 9
Gross domestic
saving 26 25 18
Sources: 33 U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (No. 5), U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.Q 177 (May
1981); WORI.D BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1981).
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
30
3
19
(Peso)2 767 b.
769 1,673
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give a broad measure of a country's economic performance and standard of living
respectively. These and other social factors such as literacy and life expectancy
show Mexican development to be far behind, its neighbors to the north.
Table 2 highlights the structure of the three economies. Panels A and B show
that all three countries experienced a decline, between 1960 and 1979, in the share
of the labor force and of output devoted to the agricultural sector. While the
compensating increase in the United States and Canada was in services, in Mexico
it was mainly in industry. In 1979 two thirds:of the economic activity in the
United States and Canada was in services compared to only one half in Mexico. It
is a reflection of the differential productivity and stage of development that a full
third of the Mexican labor force is still employed in agriculture, compared to 3
percent in the United States. These differentials are even more striking in Panel C,
which shows a detailed distribution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1979.
The figures are self-explanatory, and they reflect the differential stages of develop-
ment of the three countries.
A similar indicator, per capita energy consumption (Panel D), may be viewed
as a proxy for the degree of mechanization in the economy. It is far smaller in
Mexico than in its two neighbors to the north. (The decline in the U.S. energy
consumption per GDP between 1960 and 1979 reflects an increase in energy effi-
ciency triggered by the rise in energy prices in this country.)
Within the manufacturing sector (Panel E), capital intensive and technologi-
cally sophisticated goods, such as machinery and transport equipment, are para-
mount in the United States. Labor intensive and relatively unsophisticated
products, such as textiles, clothing, and food products, occupy a large share of
Mexico's output. Panel F shows the distribution of final demand.
Mexican development since 1977 has been dominated by the discovery of large
oil wealth. Oil output rose from under one million barrels per day in 1976 to over
two million in 1980. A commensurate increase took place in the production of
natural gas. Coupled with the twelve-fold increase in international oil prices over
the last seven years to $32 per barrel (at home Mexican oil is still priced at $8.50
per barrel),23 the rise in output brought in a huge increase in oil revenue.
While there is intense domestic and foreign pressure on Mexico to boost its oil
output faster, the government appears intent on a go-slow policy producing just
enough to meet the needs of the economic development plan. 2 4 The announced
government plan is to use the oil wealth to build a new industrial foundation,
gradually turning a finite resource into a permanent source of wealth. An FTA
with the United States and Canada can help in that endeavor.
C. Structure of Foreign Trade
1. Production Structure. The differential structure of production is reflected in
the structure of trade, as shown in Table 3.
23. Seib, W1ll Lopez Portl/lo Stic* to Hzs Oil Plan?, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
24. Id
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TABLE 3
STRUCTURE OF THREE COUNTRIES' TRADE
(A) Percentage Distribution of Exports (X) and Imports (M) Among Commodities
Total ($billions)
Percentage Distribution (%)
Food
Agricultural raw materials
Fuels
Ores and metals
Manufactures
Chemicals
Non-electrical machinery
Electrical machinery
Transport equipment
Textiles and clothing
USA (1979)
X M
173.6 217.5
18.9%
5.5
3.2
9.2%
3.2
29.3
8.5
48.3
3.9
7.0
6.0
12.5
4.0
Canada (1979)
X M
55.1 52.6
11.4%
12.1
13.2
14.8
48.2
5.7
8.2
2.5
19.4
0.9
7.3%
2.5
9.3
6.2
73.4
6.3
18.5
6.1
24.6
4.4
Mexico (1977)
X M
4.2 5.6
33.8%
5.4
21.9
12.7
26.2
6.5
2.7
1.7
1.5
8.0
13.1%
3.8
3.0
8.6
71.6
15.1
21.4
8.5
15.4
1.6
(B) Major Exports of Each Country (1977)
Commodity
All commodities
Road motor vehicles
Machines nes, nonelectric
Aircraft
Oil seeds, nuts, kernels
Electrical machinery
Maize, unmilled
Office machines
Power machinery non-elec.
Specialized machinery nes
Organic chemicals
Coal, coke, briquettes
Wheat, unmilled
Electrical power machines
Instruments, apparatus
Telecommunications equipments
Remainder
United States
Value ($billions) Percent of U.S. Total X
$117.9 100.0%
11.8 10.0
8.4 2.1
5.9 5.0
4.8 4.1
4.6 3.9
4.1 3.5
3.6 3.1
3.6 3.1
3.6 3.0
3.2 2.7
2.7 2.3
2.7 2.3
2.3 2.0
2.2 1.9
2.1 1.8
52.2 44.3
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Commodity
All commodities
Road motor vehicles
Paper and paperboard
Gas, natural and manufactured
Wood, shaped
Pulp and wastepaper
Wheat, etc., unmilled
Crude petroleum, etc.
Power machinery, nonelectric
Nonferrous metals
Iron ore, concentrates
Aluminum
Machines nes nonelectric
Fish
Other crude minerals
Fertilizers
Remainder
Value ($billions)
$41.3
8.8
2.6
2.3
2.3
2.0
1.7
1.6
1.3
1.2
1.0
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
13.0
Canada
Percent of Total X
100.0%
21.3
6.4
5.6
5.8
5.0
4.2
4.0
3.2
2.9
2.4
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.5
31.6
Mexico
Commodity Value ($billions) Percent of Total X
All commodities $4.2 100.0
Crude petroleum, etc. 0.9 21.3
Coffee 0.5 11.5
Veg., etc., fresh, simply prsvd. 0.3 7.5
Cotton 0.2 4.4
Fish fresh, simply prsvd. 0.2 4.3
Silver, platinum etc. 0.1 2.5
Inorg. elements, oxides, etc. 0. 1 1.9
Fruit, preserved, prepared 0.1 1.9
Live animals 0.1 1.8
Other crude minerals 0.1 1.6
Zinc 0.1 1.6
Textile yarn and thread 0.1 1.5
Road motor vehicles 0.05 1.3
Nonferrous base metals 0.05 1.2
Sulphur etc. 0.05 1.2
Remainder 1.5 34.6
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, Supplement 110,
120, 150, 166, 167, 178, 187, U.N. Doe. TD/STAT. 9 (1980).
Food exports are proportionately most important in Mexico, followed by fuels
(a rather recent development). While the United States is a large net importer of
fuels, Canada and especially Mexico are net exporters. However, Mexico exports
mainly crude petroleum, and is a net importer of petroleum products. Manufac-
turing exports are proportionately most important in the United States and least
important in Mexico, and of median importance in Canada. Canada, and more so
Mexico, are net importers of manufactured products. Within the manufacturing
sector, Mexican exports are heavily concentrated in textiles and clothing, as well as
other labor intensive products. U.S. exports (and to a lesser extent those of Ca-
nada), are centered in capital intensive and technologically sophisticated items,
which in turn form the bulk of Mexican manufacturing imports. Agricultural
products and high technology items loom important in U.S. exports. By contrast,
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Mexican exports are heavily weighted with food, agricultural or raw material-
based items, and labor intensive goods. Canada exports mainly grains, materials
and material-based products ('le., paper and pulp) and technologically sophisti-
cated commodities.
These figures conform well to theoretical expectations. The neo-factor propor-
tion theory of international trade-which dates back to the work of the Swedish
economists Heckescher and Ohlin-explains the commodity composition of trade
as a marriage between (a) the relativefactor endowment of the countries and (b) the
relative factor zntensit' of the products. 25 Each country will produce the product that
uses intensely its relatively abundant and cheap factor of production. In a rela-
tively labor abundant country such as Mexico, goods and production processes
utilizing a lower capital-to-labor ratio will be chosen, while in relatively capital
abundant countries such as the United States, goods and processes with relatively
high capital-to-labor ratios will be chosen.
Mutually beneficial trade is thus possible between all countries. As trade is
freed, the exchange rate may need to be adjusted to insure that each country is
competitive in the products in which it has a comparative advantage. The coun-
tries that are endowed heavily with unskilled labor will have a lower standard of
living than those endowed heavily with capital and/or highly technical and profes-
sional personnel.
2. Intra-North American Trade. Table 4 presents the total trade of the three North
American countries, as well as their trade with each other. In both 1972 and 1980,
a quarter of total U.S. trade was with Canada and Mexico. With respect to the
global U.S. figures, it might be noted that in 1980 the United States imported $79
billion worth of fuel (mainly crude petroleum). 26 In the case of Canada, two thirds
of 1980 imports and exports are with the United States, and an insignificant pro-
TABLE 4
INTRA-NORTH AMERICAN TRADE ($BILLIONS)
1972 1980
U.S.A. Exports Imports Exports Imports
Total trade 50.0 59.0 220.7 253.0
Trade with Canada 12.4 15.8 354 42.0
Trade with Mexico 2.0 2.0 15.1 12.8
Canada
Total trade 21.1 19.4 67.5 60.7
Trade with U.S. 14.1 13.1 41.1 41.2
Trade with Mexico 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3
Mexico
Total trade 1.7 2.7 15.3 19.5
Trade with U.S. 1L1 1.6 9.7 12.8
Trade with Canada 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4
Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE YEARBOOK 111, 156, 195 (1981).
25. KREININ, supra note 4, at ch. 12.
26. GATT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1979/80 app. tables (1981).
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portion with Mexico. Similarly, two thirds of Mexican trade is with the United
States, and an insignificant proportion is with Canada.
This pattern reflects the immense relative size of the U.S. economy, the relative
factor endowments of the three countries, and the U.S. geographical location be-
tween the two other countries. An FTA may somewhat stimulate Canada-Mexico
trade. Yet, given the existing trade patterns it is reasonable to consider separately
the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico trade flows.
D. U.S.-Canada Trade
1. Composition of Trade. Table 5 shows (first two columns) the 1980 bilateral
U.S.-Canada trade flows, classified by main commodity categories. For reference
purposes, the table also provides (last four columns) the total trade figures for the
two countries.
Both countries are major exporters of food, but primarily to third markets
rather than to each other. In fuels and other primary materials, Canada is by far a
net exporter to the United States, but these exports already enter the U.S. market
TABLE 5
U.S.-CANADA TRADE, 1978 ($BILLIONS)
Commody Group
Primary Products
Food
Raw materials
Ores and minerals
Fuels
Nonferrous metals
U.S. Export to
Canada
5.7(18%)
7 %
I dist.
of
3 mfgs
6 exp.
Canada Export
to the U.S.
17.0(43%)
1.8 %
3.7 dist.
1.5 of
7.7 mfgs
2.3 exp.
Total
Total U.S. Canada
Trade Trade
Exp. Imp.
68.6 115.4
38.8 19.1
10.9 6.1
5.8 3.6
7.9 78.9
5.2 7.7
Exp. Imp.
32.5 15.5
7.8 4.3
7.0 1.3
4.7 1.9
9.0 7.2
4.0 0.8
Manufacturers
Iron and Steel
Chemicals
Other semi-mfgs
Specialized machinery
Office and
telecommunication
equipment
Road motor vehicles*
Other machinery and trans.
equipment
Household appliances
Textiles and clothing
Other consumer goods
Total Trade
25.8(82%)
0.5
2.5
1.1
5.0
100%
2%
10
4
19
22.6(57%)
1.3
2.4
3.9
2.0
1.3 5 0.8
7.5 29 8.2
100%
6%
11
17
9
138.3
3.1
24.4
6.9
24.7
118.8
7.4
9.9
10.2
10.3
3 13.0 9.0 1.1 2.8
36 14.2 25.7 9.1 10.4
209.6 238.4 63.1 57.7
*Subject to the U.S.-Canada automobile pact.
Source: GATT, INTERNATIONAl. TRADE, 1980/81 tables A-17, A-18 (1981).
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duty free. An FTA is unlikely to cause resource reallocation between the primary
products and manufacturing sectors. Most resource reallocation will take place
within manufacturing.
Because of the nature of the FTA under consideration, special significance at-
taches to trade in manufactures. Neither country is a major exporter of labor in-
tensive goods such as textiles and clothing. Note, however, that both countries
produce these products and their domestic output faces foreign competition from
third country sources. Canada is a net exporter to the United States of semimanu-
factures, and it is a net importer of most other categories. To cast additional light
on the structure of bilateral trade, the table also shows the percentage distribution
of their manufacturing export to each other. Machinery items loom relatively im-
portant in U.S. exports, and road motor vehicles in Canadian exports, reflecting
the U.S.-Canada auto agreement.
What is significant about the figures is that there exists a substantial two way
trade between the two countries in many industries. This phenomenon is in con-
formity with the nature of trade among industrial countries; it takes the form of
intraindustry rather than interindustry shipments, with each country specializing
in specific varieties of goods within each industry. Intraindustry specialization in-
tensifies as trade barriers are brought down.
2. 4n FT. There exists a major and detailed study of the economic conse-
quences of a free trade area between Canada and the United States. 2 7 It includes,
among other things, production cost comparisons for individual industries between
the two countries. The study shows that significant benefits would flow to both
countries from an FTA between them. The estimated gains are 10 percent of GNP
in the case of Canada, and 1 percent of GNP for the United States. Contrary to
common belief, there would be no wholesale liquidation of industries in Canada.
Specialization would occur within each industry rather than between industries.
Liquidation of some inefficient individual firms is expected, but the remaining
firms in each industry would enjoy higher efficiency because of greater specializa-
tion, increased competition, and longer production runs made possible by far
larger markets. In short, Canadian industry would be reorganized and rational-
ized as a result of an FTA. While these benefits are smaller in the case of the
United States, even here tfiere is likely to be increased efficiency because of greater
competitive pressure, and some benefits flowing from larger market size. Lower
labor costs in Canada would induce some U.S. firms to set up subsidiaries north of
the border or expand existing subsidiaries there. But overall there is likely to be
some reduction in the inflow of U.S. investment capital to Canada as trade in
goods substitutes partly for capital movement. The Canadian cost advantage is
paramount in the areas of the country close to the U.S. industrial heartland, e.g.,
27. WONNACOTT & WONNACOTr, supra note 1.
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the Windsor-Toronto-Montreal area.28 This implies certain geographical reloca-
tion of industry within Canada. Within each industry, there would be a tendency
in Canada to drift toward labor intensive activities. But increased efficiency would
tend to raise Canadian real wage rates towards the U.S. level.
These eventual gains would not come without significant adjustment costs, al-
though such costs are minimized by the fact that the expansion of trade would
occur along intraindustry and not interindustry lines. At the very least, these costs
include transfer of resources (including labor) between firms within the same in-
dustry and between geographic locations. Such transitional costs would be far
greater in Canada than in the United States simply because of the relative impor-
tance of trade with the partner country in the total economy. As a consequence it
might be necessary to allow a longer transitional period for Canada, perhaps ten
years as against five years for the United States, over which the tariff reductions
could be staged. Additionally each country would have to set up a sizeable "ad-
justment assistance fund," with which to help labor and capital in the adjustment
process. 29
The fact that the two countries are already the main trading partners of each
other, coupled with the existence of cost differentials in various subindustries be-
tween the two countries and with the nature of the outcome outlined above, sug-
gests that trade creation is likely to be far greater than trade diversion. Such trade
diversion as may occur is likely to be offset by the expected reduction in produc-
tion costs in many industries as they are rationalized following the introduction of
an FTA.
E. U.S.-Mexico Trade
1. Structure of Trade. Recent data for U.S.-Mexico trade are not as readily
available as those for Canada. Consequently Table 6 was extracted from a U.N.
publication pertaining to the United States. In Part A commodities are classified
28. d
29. Any national policy that benefits the entire economy is likely to harm certain sectors or segments
of the population. It is in the nature of tariff reductions that the benefits are spread over millions of
consumers, while the cost (or damage) is concentrated in a few import-competing industries. Sometimes
these industries are highly visible and possess considerable political clout.
On both humanitarian and economic grounds, it is desirable for the government to aid these declining
industries to adjust to increased volume of imports, attendant upon the tariff reduction. Most industrial
countries make provisions for such assistance.
In the United States, trade adjustment assistance is part of the Trade Reform Act of 1974. See
KREININ, supra note 4, at ch. 14. It provides assistance to workers and firms heavily impacted by import
competition to shift to alternative lines of production. However, there has been considerable abuse of the
intent of this legislation. Particularly in autos and steel it often happened that workers received trade
adjustment assistance simply as a form of unemployment compensation-waiting to be recalled to their old
jobs.
As LDCs (and mainly the so-called New Industrial Countries or NICs) expand their manufacturing
exports to the industrial countries, they are interested in blunting political opposition to expanded imports
in those countries. In international forums, they therefore press for an elaborate trade adjustment assist-
ance inside the industrial countries.
Among the LDCs themselves, any country undergoing a transition from import substitution to export
promotion strategy would require adjustment assistance to the contracting industries during the transition
period.
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by the first digit of the Standard International Trade Classification of Commodi-
ties (SITC) of which categories 5 through 8 are manufactured goods. While three
quarters of U.S. exports to Mexico are comprised of manufactures, only 40 per-
TABLE 6
U.S.-MExIco TRADE, 1979 ($BILLIONS)
(A) All Trade (Classified by 1st Digit SITC)
U.S. Import From Mexico U.S. Exp. to Mexico
Commodity Group SITC $millions % of Total $millions % of Total
Food and live animals 0 $1,490 m. 17% $754 m. 8%
Beverages and tobacco 1 82 1 4 0
Crude metals 2 280 3 652 7
Mineral fuels 3 3,153 35 226, 3
Oils and fats 4 2 0 44 1
Chemicals 5 194 2 1,084 11
Basic manufactures 6 892 10 1,232 13
Machinery and trans. 41% 77%
equip. 7 1,893 21 4,610 47
Other manufactures 8 708 8 621 6
Special transactions 9 289 3 436 4
Total $8-,9-8-3- $9,6-67 1-0071
(B) Manufactures (Categories 5-8 SITC)
Chemicals 5 $ 194 m. 5% $1,084 m. 13%
Basic mfgs. 6 892 20 1,232 16
Leather goods 18 1 16 0
Rubber manufactures 11 0 64 1
Wood manufactures 86 2 22 0
Paper and
paperboard 54 1 161 2
Textiles and yarn 65 3 105 2
Minerals 109 2 85 1
Iron and steel 73 1 383 5
Non-Ferrous metals 379 8 147 2
Metal manufactures 97 2 248 3
Machinery and trans.
equip. 7 1,893 52 4,610 62
Non-electrical
machinery 995 11 2,734 36
Electrical machinery 661 35 632 9
Transport
equipment 237 6 1,244 17
Other manufactures 8 708 23 621 9
Plumbing
equipment 22 0 12 0
Furniture 39 1 19 0
Travel goods 28 1 3 0
Clothing 224 9 128 2
Footwear 47 2 4 0
Precision
instruments 51 2 194 3
Other 297 8 261 4
Total Mfgs, 5-8 $3,687 100% $7,547 100%
Source: 29:19 Commodity Trade Statistics 1979, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STST/SER.D/85-19 (1981).
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cent of U.S. imports from Mexico are in this category. In contrast, food, fuels and
metals weigh relatively heavily in U.S imports from Mexico, and many of these
enter the U.S. market duty free.
Because the proposed FTA is limited to manufactures, Part B presents the per-
centage distribution of these products classified by the more detailed commodity
breakdown; namely, the three and/or four digit SITC. Chemicals, machinery,
transport equipment and instruments weigh heavily in U.S. exports to Mexico.
Among U.S. imports, the important items are basic manufactures, electrical ma-
chinery, and clothing. The sizeable two-way flow in electrical machinery should
not leave the impression that the same types of machines are imported and ex-
ported. U.S imports from Mexico are concentrated in telecommunications equip-
ment and transistors, while tractors, civil engineering and textile machinery weigh
heavily in U.S. exports to Mexico.
Unlike the case of Canada, a U.S.-Mexico FTA is likely to lead to some mea-
sure of interindustry specialization. Although no detailed industry study is avail-
able, the previously outlined theory suggests that Mexico would move to specialize
in labor intensive as well as material-based products, while the United States
would expand the exports of capital intensive goods needed for the Mexican indus-
trialization program. Considering the existing trade barriers, the expansion of
trade would probably be of considerable magnitude, yielding sizeable benefits in
terms of economic efficiency. But the "pains of adjustment" in terms of economic
dislocation would also be severe, suggesting strong political opposition to free
trade, and requiring large scale government assistance to labor unions, firms, and
indeed whole communities that may be adversely affected. 30
2. An FTA: Mexican Exports. Consider first U.S. imports and Mexican ex-
ports. Half of the total are fuels and primary materials which already enter the
United States duty free, or would otherwise remain unaffected by an FTA in man-
ufactured products. When it comes to manufactures, a limited quantity enters the
United States under the GSP duty free, or under U.S. tariff item 807.00 subject to
very low duty. The remaining items pay a moderate to high tariff.
In particular, labor intensive goods tend to face reasonably stiff rates in the
United States. In addition, such imports are subject to a variety of quantitative
restrictions that directly limit the quantity that may be imported. For example,
international trade in textiles (cottons, woolens, and synthetics) is governed by an
international commodity agreement which specifies the quantities that are admit-
ted to each importing country. While an annual growth factor of 6 percent is
embodied in the agreement, that factor is drastically curtailed by bilateral agree-
ments (known as "voluntary" export restraints) between the United States and
each major supplying country. 3 ' Growing imports of other commodities, when
30. See the discussion at note 29 supra.
31. KREININ, supra note 4, at ch. 15.
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they reach a proportion that threatens domestic output, generate demands for sim-
ilar action.
A final feature of the U.S. tariff (as well as that of other industrial countries) on
labor intensive products is the escalation of rates by degree of processing. Raw
materials enter duty free, intermediate products enter at moderate duty and
finished products are subject to high tariff rates.32 This constitutes an inducement
to exporting countries to ship products in unfinished form, rather than complete
the fabrication at home, and export finished manufactures.
All these features of U.S. protection would disappear in an FTA, so one could
expect a substantial expansion of manufacturing exports from Mexico to the
United States. A large portion of these new trade flows would be in labor intensive
products, such as textiles, clothing, leather goods, and lumber products. Since
these are products in which Mexico has a comparative advantage, the benefits to
the Mexican economy in terms of expanded output, increased employment and
improved efficiency are obvious. They are likely to be sizeable.
What of the impact on the United States? Because these tend to be declining
industries in the United States to begin with, the adjustment pains to increased
imports may be severe. The adjustment process calls for shifting U.S. labor and
capital from the import-competing to the export industries. By implication this is
a shift of resources from labor intensive to capital intensive industries, which
would increase the overall efficiency of the U.S. economy. In all probability the
labor intensive industries would not be eliminated altogether. Rather, they would
shrink, and at the same time shift production towards specialty products. Once
the adjustment process is completed, the efficiency gain to the U.S. economy might
be of considerable magnitude.
One mitigating factor in the U.S. adjustment process may be the lessening
pressure on, or incentive for, Mexican workers to migrate north of the border. As
export opportunities for Mexican industry expand with the opening up of the U.S.
export market, more workers would be absorbed in Mexican industry, and wage
rates in Mexico may rise somewhat. The inducement for legal or illegal migration
would decline. Free commodity movements in an FTA would substitute for labor
mobility across the border.
A second factor alleviating the adjustment problem in this country is the pro-
spective expansion of U.S. exports to Mexico. An FTA is a two-way deal. As the
machinery and other capital intensive industries expand their imports to Mexico,
they should be able (after retraining, relocation, and other adjustments) to absorb
the resources released from the labor intensive sector.
3. An FTA: US Exports. Mexico has adopted a mixture of import substitu-
tion as well as export-oriented strategies to further its goals as a developing coun-
try.
Under an import substitution strategy, the country surrounds itself by a high
level of protection, consisting of tariffs, import quotas, exchange controls and the
32. Id at ch. 13.
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like. Behind this shelter it expands domestic production to replace imports, at first
producing nondurable consumer goods, which are labor intensive in nature and
require unsophisticated techniques. Usually, the next step is to turn to the final
processing of assembly-type commodities, generating a shift in the composition of
imports away from these final products and toward intermediate and capital
goods. To do this, the protective structure is escalated by the degree of processing,
with final goods more highly protected than intermediate ones.
This strategy, if pursued too far, leads to inefficiencies. The fact that speciali-
zation and economies of scale cannot be fully exploited raises costs and prices well
above the world market level. First, the protective structure has produced many
instances in which the foreign exchange costs of the intermediate imported materi-
als are greater than the foreign exchange value of the final products in which they
are embodied. 33 Second, by restricting the demand for imports, the exchange
value of the currency is valued upward artificially as compared with free market
conditions, making it more difficult to export primary or manufactured products.
Thus the policy discriminates in favor of import-competing industries and against
export industries. However, a unit of foreign exchange saved by import substitu-
tion costs more in terms of domestic resources than a unit of foreign exchange
earned by exports. Third, because the domestic marketiis usually too small to
support an optimal-size plant, excess capacity tends to develop. Thus the widen-
ing of the internal market is one main benefit that accrues from regional integra-
tion and allocation of industries among the developing countries. However, such
steps are usually insufficient and must be supplemented by orienting exports to-
ward the developed world. Fourth, because the system of protection and other
policies subsidize the importation of capital goods (at times coupled with artifi-
cially high wage rates brought about by union pressure), there is a strong incentive
to use capital intensive techniques regardless of the country's factor endowments.
Finally, foreign capital that flows into the protected industries often does not gen-
erate export earnings but instead aggravates the debt-servicing problem. 34
An export-oriented strategy on the other hand, involves a change in the system
of incentives in favor of exports, minimizing or eliminating the discrimination
against them. Countries may even introduce a variety of fiscal incentives to in-
crease exporters' earnings or to reduce exporters' costs (such as reducing or remov-
ing duties on imported inputs or reducing the exporters' income taxes). Some
countries (such as Mexico and Taiwan) established duty free processing zones into
which inputs are imported duty free and from which final goods are exported after
processing. 35 In other cases, tariff rates have been reduced and harmonized, or the
currency has been devalued (frequent mini-devaluations in the case of Brazil). 36
The major effect has been to expand the export of labor intensive manufactured
products and to avoid the establishment of insulated, highly inefficient domestic
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id at ch. 17.
36. E. Suplicy, The Effects of Minidevaluation on the Brazilian Economy (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation
at Michigan State University).
[Vol. 44: No. 3
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
industries. The development experience of countries following export-oriented
strategy has tended to be more favorable, in terms of growth rate and expansion of
employment, than that of countries developing strictly via import substitution. 37
Mexico's position appears to be between the two extremes. A measure of im-
port substitution is pursued, resulting in fairly high tariff rates in some industries,
and great dispersion in the degree of protection accorded various industries. Al-
though recent systematic data are not available, Table 7 shows the average nomi-
nal protection (rates published in the country's tariff schedule) and effective
protection (rates imposed on domestic value added, calculated by economists) for
several industries. Effective protection on manufacturing industries, the most rele-
vant figure for the purpose at hand, averages 43 percent. In the case of consumer
durables it rises above 100 percent, suggesting a degree of import substitution in
that sector. In the case of intermediate products, machinery, and transport equip-
ment, the effective rates exceed 40 percent.
TABLE 7
NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR MAJOR PRODUCT CATEGORIES IN
MEXICO, 1960
Industry Group Nominal Effective
Protection Protection
I Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 7 3
II Processed food 18 5
III Beverages and tobacco 29 48
IV Mining and tobacco 4 -5
V Construction materials -4 1
VI-A Intermediate products I 22 42
VI-B Intermediate products II 25 42
VI Intermediate products I and II 24 42
VII Nondurable consumer goods 25 32
VIII Consumer durables 49 101
IX Machinery 29 41
X Transport equipment 26 42
I-X All industries 18 12
I + IV Primary production 6 1
II, III,
V-X Manufacturing 25 28
VI-X Manufacturing less food, beverages, tobacco, and construction
materials 28 43
Source: B. BALASSA, THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 195 (1971).
In case of an FTA the tariff charged on imports from the United States and
Canada would decline gradually, reaching zero at the end of a long transitional
period. The United States would be likely to capture a sizeable share of the mar-
ket in the machinery and durable goods industries, while Mexican resources would
move to specialize in products in which Mexico possesses a comparative advan-
tage. The fact that the North American market would open up to these Mexican
exports should ease the Mexican adjustment to some extent.
37. McKinnon, Foreqgn Trade Regimes and Economic Development, 9J. INT'L ECON. 429 (1979) (summariz-
ing the results of studies of several countries conducted by the National Bureau for Economic Research).
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Economic efficiency in Mexico would benefit from an FTA on both sides of the
trade equation. Increased imports would add competitive pressure on Mexican
industries, forcing reorganization, rationalization and reallocation of resources.
Freer access to export markets would enable Mexico to move towards greater spe-
cialization in products in which it possesses a comparative advantage. Since Mex-
ico's advantage is mainly in labor intensive industries, this specialization should
increase demand for labor, reduce disguised unemployment, increase earnings, and
lessen the pressure to emigrate north of the border. Longer production runs and
economies of scale in production and distribution would also follow. Finally, the
nonreversible removal of protection would spur both domestic and foreign invest-
ments in the Mexican economy.
In sum, an FTA should induce Mexico to follow a policy that would be benefi-
cial even in the absence of an FTA: that of shedding the vestiges of import substi-
tution and replacing it by export promotion. All this contains the seeds of
substantial benefits. But the transition period is likely to be painful, necessitating
large scale government assistance.
38
4. Trade Creation and Diversion. For the most part, the increase in U.S. exports
to Mexico would replace inefficient domestic production in that country. Such
trade creation, coupled with the lower prices the Mexican consumer would enjoy,
is clearly beneficial.
In most machinery items and many durable goods, the United States is com-
petitive with alternative sources of supply available to Mexico, especially consider-
ing the geographical proximity and the consequent low transport costs. This is
apparent from the sharp worldwide expansion of U.S. manufacturing exports in
1979 and 1980 and the rise of the U.S. share in world export markets. 39 These
facts, coupled with the large U.S share in Mexican imports prior to integration,
suggest that trade diversion would be much smaller than creation.
Even so, there are reasons to expect at least some trade diversion. First, there
are certain products, such as small cars, where the cheapest suppliers are outside
North America, and the tariff discrimination would give U.S. producers a compet-
itive edge. This could be partly offset by agreement of the U.S. producers to set up
production facilities in Mexico, combining American technology with relatively
cheap Mexican labor. The second reason for expecting some trade diversion
relates to the energy efficiency of U.S.-made machinery. Considering the past low
energy prices in North America relative to those in Europe and Japan, the Europe-
ans and Japanese produce more energy efficient machines. These are preferred by
the LDCs. Without the tariff discrimination favoring the United States certain
types of capital equipment may have been imported into Mexico from outside
North America. This factor is mitigated by the increase in energy efficiency of
38. See the discussion at note 29 supra.
39. The share of the United States in the manufacturing exports of all industrial countries rose from
14.7 percent in 1977 to 15.6 percent in 1980. See GATT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1980/81 app. tables([981).
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U.S.-made machines resulting from the rise in fuel prices, and by the fact that
energy is abundant in Mexico.
In the case of Mexican exports to the United States there is reason to expect
some trade diversion from other labor abundant countries. But this is mitigated
by the fact that imports of labor intensive products into the United States are
severely restricted by tariffs as well as quantitative restrictions. Thus the opening
up of the U.S. market to Mexican products would displace mainly domestic out-
put (trade creation) rather than exports from third countries. Finally, it might be
noted that when a country suffers from large-scale disguised unemployment-as is
the case in Mexico-trade diversion is not necessarily harmful.
F. Mexico-Canada Trade
Trade between Mexico and Canada is of minute proportion. It may be ex-
pected to expand when trade barriers are removed, but one is hard put to assess
the scope and nature of this expansion. In all likelihood, both trade creation and
diversion would occur, but with the former exceeding the latter. This trade would
continue to be dwarfed by the U.S.-Mexico trade.
IV
SUMMARY
A North American FTA in manufactured products can yield considerable eco-
nomic benefits to the three countries involved. It is also likely to be beneficial for
worldwide resource allocation. However, all three countries would undergo a
painful adjustment process, during which resources would be reallocated both be-
tween and within industries to attain greater efficiency and rationalization of in-
dustrial production. This dictates a rather lengthy transitional period during
which trade liberalization is staged, perhaps longer for Mexico and Canada than
for the United States. Large scale government assistance within each country
would be required to smooth out the transition. Once completed, however, the
benefits would far outweigh the adjustment costs.
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